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THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY ON INTERRACIAL
CONFLICT IN NEW YORK STATE
SELF -DEFENSE CASES
by Jay Lippman

I. INTRODUCTION
Should criminal trial judges allow expert testimony on
the socio-psychological aspects of interracial conflict? A
trial court admitted such testimony in Peoplev. Longmire.1
In Longmire, a young black college student was indicted
for the murder of a white youth and the attempted murder
of another. Ronald Longmire claimed that these victims
and four other white youths confronted him in his dormitory
room and threatened to kill him. In self-defense he reached for an object, a knife. Longmire feared for his life. During the ensuing struggle over the knife two of the the attackers were stabbed.
At trial, upon the motion of Longmire's attorney (Paul
Cleary, Esq.), the trial court allowed expert testimony on
interracial conflict. 2 The jury acquitted Longmire of
homicide and attempted homicide charges, apparently considering evidence of interracial conflict in its decision. The
expert's testimony may have enabled Longmire to undermine the prevalent societal perception of Blacks as "niggets with knives," who are guilty of all crimes for which
they are charged because of race.
This article will examine Longmire closely and attempt
to determine why a defendant like Longmire needs expert
testimony on interracial conflict to secure a fair trial and
exoneration. The legal basis for the admissibility of this
evidence will then be discussed. Finally, it will be argued
that in self-defense cases involving interracial conflict, a trial
judge should allow evidence pertaining to interracial conflict from a black defendant's perspective, but not from a

Jay Martin Lippman received his J.D. degree from the State
University of New York at Buffalo in May of 1987 and has since
been admitted to practice in New York State.
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white defendant's position. This discussion will be applied
to the celebrated Bernhard Goetz case in which a white
male was acquitted of attempting to murder and assault
four black youths who accosted him on a New York City
subway train. 4 As in Longmire's case, the initial reaction
to the Goetz incident by most Americans was that a white
man was the innocent victim of hostile and violent blacks.
There has been an increase of white mob violence
against blacks and other minorities' and racial prejudice
seemingly runs rampant. Therefore the probability of a case
similar to Longmire occurring again is high. Hence, a discussion of the use and admission of expert testimony on interracial confrontation is appropriate in order to vitiate prejudice and secure justice.
II. LONGMIRE
A. Case Facts

In the early morning hours of October 21, 1984,
Ronald Longmire, a twenty-one year old student at State
University of New York at Buffalo, was sobbing in his dormitory room.6 A female companion was with him.'
Longmire was upset because his roommate, Richard
Boulware, and he had fought over the condition of their
room earlier that morning.8 Suddenly, five to six white
youths, friends of Boulware, entered the room.9 The group
entered the small room ostensibly to retaliate against
Longmire because of the fight. Scott Allen, the nineteen
year old brother of Howard and Craig, entered Mr.
Longmire's room with a tire iron, which Mr. Longmlre did
not see.'° According to Longmire and his companion, they
threatened at least once to kill Longmire.II Four members
of the group surrounded Longmire, whose back was up
against a desk.12 On the desk was a kitchen utensil cup
containing, among other items, a steak knife. 13 One of the
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youths, Howard Allen, 21, stepped behind Longmire and
began to choke him with a "half-nelson" hold. 14 Pushing
and shoving ensued."5 Longmire reached for the steak
knife. 1 6 Howard Allen clamped his free hand on the hand
of Longmire which contained the knife.1 7 As the two
grappled over the knife, an intoxicated Craig Allen, 18,
Howard's younger brother, and William Drmacich, 20, approached Longmire. 18 Both were stabbed. 19 Craig Allen
received a fatal wound to the heart. 20 Drmacich was cut
in the abdominal area, and survived.2" Howard Allen would
later testify at trial that Longmire angrily told him, "Icould
cut you, too, white meat!"2 2 Longmire was subsequently
arrested and charged with several offenses including murder
and attempted murder.2 3 On December 17, 1984, a Buffalo grand jury issued a six count indictment. Two of those
Longmire of murder and attempted
counts 2accused
4
murder.

Immediately after the incident the Buffalo media
covered the case with an obvious slant toward the slain
youth and against Longmire. The media sought reactions
from the youth's parents and friends.2 5 These people claimed that the deceased
was a model citizen who never look26
ed for trouble.

In contrast, the media mischaracterized Longmire as
27

a college drop-out.

The media failed to report that the

University of Buffalo had banned Longmire from its campuses. 28 Also, the media did not state that Longmire was
just as, if not more,29respected in his community as the dead
youth was in his.

B. Crucible
1. The trial
On February 10, 1986, Longmire's three and one-half
week trial commenced in Erie County Supreme Court."
An all-white jury was impaneled over the objections of
defense attorney Paul G. Cleary. 3 ' Essentially, the prosecution's theory of the case was that Longmire had the specific
intent to kill his victims. The People attempted to
characterize Longmire as an aggressive individual who intentionally stabbed the two youths.3 2 In fact, one of the
white participants testified that Longmire challenged the
deceased Craig Allen: "Take your best shot! You and me

would not believe Longmire's story. This jury, imbued with
white society's racist presumptions, might have viewed
Longmire as a "typical, violent Black." Longmire's conduct
was reconciliable with these stereotypes. It might have been
very difficult for the jurors to believe that the youths were
the initial aggressors given the assumption that "Blacks are
more prone to violence than Whites."
Second, a Black killed a White. The white jurors might
have been more sympathetic to one of their own (the slain
Craig Allen) than to a Black (Longmire).
Third, this crime might have horrified the jury more
so than a Black on Black confrontation or one in which
a White kills a Black. Studies indicate that black defendants, especially those with white victims, will tend to be
acquitted less often and receive more severe sentences.
Killers of Whites are sentenced to death more frequently
than killers of Blacks. In fact, from 1982 to 1985 those
jurisdictions studied
did not execute a white for the slay3 7
ing of a Black.

The Longmire case was an "underdog" case. To win,
Cleary had to overcome societal perceptions of crime.
These perceptions operate in favor of white defendants and
against black defendants - particularly those Blacks who
commit crimes against Whites.3 8 The Buffalo media por-

trayed Craig Allen as a sympathetic white victim of a crime
and Longmire as a violent black perpetrator, which was
only a reflection of societal attitudes and perceptions.
Also, Cleary noted how the public responded to
Bernhard Goetz's conduct. Without considering the
evidence which undermines Goetz's self-defense claim,
many Americans hail Goetz as a hero.3 9 He struck back
40

against violence, as personified by his black attackers.
If this was (and is) a prevalent attitude, then the odds for
Longmire's acquittal were low.
What could Longmire do to avoid a wrongful conviction? How could Longmire convince his all-white jury that
he was not "another nigger with a knife" but an individual
who had a justifiable and reasonable fear for his life? Indeed, Longmire testified in his own defense and explained
to the jury his fears. The jury had an opportunity to hear
an intelligent, non-violent individual present his case. But,
was Longmire's testimony enough?

right here!"33 Another stated that Longmire lunged at the

decedent with the steak knife. 4
As was expected, Longmire claimed that he acted in
self-defense. 35 He testified that he feared that the intruders

were going to kill him. At least once, one member of the
group threatened, "Let's kill his ass!" Longmire's reaching
for the knife
was a defensive measure to ward off his
6
assailants.

3

2. The quandry
Even though the facts gave rise to a plausible selfdefense claim, Cleary (Longmire's attorney) was not confident that the jury would acquit Longmire. First, Longmire's
jury was all white. Cleary was concerned that the jurors
48

3. Expert testimony on interracialconflict
With an eye toward the battered women cases in
which the defendants use expert testimony to explain why
women battered by their male victims kill in self-defense, 4'
Cleary and Longmire summoned an expert. 42 The expert
was Dr. Charles P. Ewing, a licensed psychologist and law
43
professor at the State University of New York at Buffalo.
Dr. Ewing testified that it was reasonable for Longmire to
fear that his white attackers were about to kill or maim
him.44 Longmire's life experience as a Black in a country
with a well-documented history of white mob violence
against Blacks gave rise to this reasonable belief. In addition to testifying on interracial conflict, Dr. Ewing testified
INTHE PUBUC INTEREST

on two other socio-psychological phenomena.
One such phenomenon was the psychology of fear.
This body of thought distinguishes between a fear-induced
response to external stimuli and an aggression-induced
response to the same stimuli. Dr. Ewing testified that
Mr. Longmire's act of self-defense was based on fearinduced response emanating from the interracial confrontation in Mr. Longmires living space.
The other area concerned psycho-physiological
arousal. Dr. Ewing stated that the mind and body respond
differently to the same external stimuli. Mr. Longmire
testified that he had calmed down after the fight with his
roommate and before the confrontation with his white
assailants. However, although Mr. Longmire's mind may
have calmed down, his body may not have calmed down
as quickly. This is because the body recovers slower than
the mind after exposure to external stress. Thus, Mr.
Longmires body was still more susceptible to arousal when
the white youths entered his room.45 Directly referring to
Professor Ewing's testimony during his summation, Cleary
asked the all-white jurors to consider the fear each of them
accosted in their
would have experienced had they been
46
youths.
black
of
band
a
by
homes
4. The verdict
On March 4, 1986, the jury returned its verdict acquitting Longmire of all counts save for the one entailing the
fight with his roommate. The jury exonerated Longmire of
and all lesser included homicide
murder, attempted murder
47
and assault offenses.
But, to what extent did Dr. Ewing's expert opinions
influence the jury? Defense attorney Cleary had informal
contact with three jurors within three months of the verdict date. These three all concurred that the expert's
testimony helped to convince the jury that Mr. Longmire's
conduct was justified and that the young Black was innocent.48 Apparently, Dr. Ewing's expert testimony on interracial conflict from a Black's perspective countered societal
stereotypes perhaps held by the jurors and fostered by the
prosecutor's portrayal of Longmire. Such testimony helped
to indeed undermine the notion that all Blacks have a
natural predisposition to violence and do not fear for their
lives. 49 Also, this testimony articulated a sociopsychological experience of which the jury and even
Longmire might not be aware.
However, there is no New York State precedent supporting the admissibility of expert evidence on interracial
conflict from a Black's perspective. Nationally, there is only one authority supporting admissibility. A New Mexico
Court of Appeals decision ruled that a trial court erred in
barring expert testimony on Blacks' general fear of, and
50
the particular black defendant's own fear of the police.
Therefore, the Longmire court broke new ground when it
decided to admit Dr. Ewing's testimony. Unfortunately, the
court did not issue a legal opinion. Given the present racial
climate in New York State, it is unfortunate that a prospecSPRING 1988

tive black self-defender in an interracial case will not have
the benefit of a judicial opinion ruling for the admission of
helpful and critical expert testimony. This article is an attempt to provide defense counsel with a legal basis from
which to argue for the admissibility of this evidence. And,
hopefully this will help future Paul Clearys to secure justice
for their clients, the Ronald Longmires of New York State.

III. EXPERT TESTIMONY ON INTERRACIAL
CONFLICT FROM A BLACK'S
PERSPECTIVE
Expert testimony on interracial conflict from a Black's
perspective addresses two different mental states. The first
is that of the black defendant who has learned to fear
Whites.5" The second is that of the average American jury,
dominated by Whites who stereotype Blacks as individuals
a jury may have
naturally predisposed to violence. Such
52
an inherent bias in favor of Whites.
A. The black defendant's state of mind
Research and observation establish that "white racism
is and has been responsible for the physiological,
sociological, and psychological genocide of third world people."53 In the United States this racism has manifested itself
in many forms ranging from random attacks on Blacks by
such blatantly racist groups as the Ku Klux Klan, to more
subtle discrimination in the job market.54 Over time Whites
have attempted to prevent Blacks from attaining full equality with Whites. In the 1960s Whites countered black civil
rights protests and marches against police brutality of
Blacks with unjustifiable and unreasonable violence. 55 A
notion of White Supremacy survives.
Such degrading conduct and attitudes have shaped
black attitudes toward and perceptions of Whites. Blacks
have come to hate, fear, and mistrust Whites. These emotions are products of both past and present white treatment of Blacks. 6
In a case like Longmire's in which Whites were the initial aggressors and a Black was the self-defender, white
tormentors were physically and psychologically assaulting
their historical victim. In such a case, the history of White
mob violence against Blacks becomes all too real for
Blacks. Blacks may fear for their lives or bodily safety not
only because white youths pose a physical threat, but also
because of fear shaped by history.
B. The jury's state of mind
Unquestionably, perceptions play a role in the guilt
determination process. Studies indicate that Whites, who
predominantly sit on American juries, are more likely to
attribute guilt to a black defendant. 57 The "own race effect" plays a role in jury verdicts. Social scientists have
noted that a juror is more likely to convict a defendant who
is not a member of her race. A defendant who is a member
49
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of the juror's race is more likely to be acquitted."8 This effect will operate in marginal evidence cases. Therefore, the
average white jury in most cases, will acquit a59white defendant and more readily convict a black one.
C. The subject of the expert's testimony
The expert, who may be a psychiatrist or a social scientist, might discuss and articulate the black defendant's own
fears of his white aggressors. The expert may testify on
how history played a role in shaping the defendant's fearful state of mind. Also, the jury may learn why Blacks
generally fear and mistrust Whites. In sum, the expert could
present evidence which, if believed, could prove that the
black defendant's conduct was reasonable and justifiable.
D. Why an expert?
Clearly, there are risks in resorting to expert testimony
on interracial conflict from a Black's position. First, the jury
might believe that testimony on this subject matter implies
that there is a separate defense for Blacks. 60 Blacks may
have the right to kill Whites whether or not Blacks act in
self-defense. Already bent on finding the black defendant
guilty, the jury might not be willing to afford such a right
to any black defendant, particularly to the black killer of
a White.
Secondly, the jury might be generally suspicious of experts. The jury might feel that it is capable of reaching a
verdict without the help of an expert. Implicitly, courts may
be supporting this view when they disallow expert
testimony on the battered woman syndrome. One of the
reasons for inadmissibility is that such testimony invades
the province of the jury. As fact-finders, jurors can assess
the defendant's fear using their common sense and experience. Expert testimony prevents jurors from performing their role as fact-finders by removing from the jurors
an assessment of guilt. In the battered woman cases this
assessment involves the reasonableness of the woman's
fear.
In roughly two-thirds of the battered women cases in
which courts admitted expert testimony on the battered
women syndrome, the women defendants were found guilty
of homicide. According to Professor Ewing, such testimony
does not guarantee acquittal, and in fact, may hurt the ac61
cused.
Despite these risks, there are benefits. The expert may
be testifying on a socio-psychological phenomenon of
which the black self-defender may be unaware. 62 This
defendant may not know that her fear of her white
assailants may have been shaped by the history of racial
discrimination in the United States. Or, if the defendant
is aware, she may be unable to articulate the effect of this
fear. The jurors may not believe the black defendant's own
self-defense contention because of race. But, after hearing
the expert's testimony, they may disregard their bias against
Blacks. The expert evidence may demonstrate to the jurors
that the accused's conduct was reasonable and justifiable.
50

The racial bias of the jury may preclude the jurors from
reaching this conclusion without expert evidence.
Finally, expert testimony could furnish the jury with
additional information about the defendant. Such information might include the effect of the history of racial oppression on the defendant's state of mind. With this information in hand, the jury would no longer consider the fate of
a Black without understanding the palpable fear of white
attackers. Studies indicate that the likelihood for acquittal
would be greater in such cases if expert evidence was
63

presented.

IV. THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT TESTIMONY
ON INTERRACIAL CONFLICT FROM A
BLACK'S PERSPECTIVE
A. The New York State self-defense statute
Under what legal principles may a trial judge admit
such testimony? First, the judge must consider the applicable New York State self-defense statute:
A person may not use deadly physical force
upon another person Uunless:
(a) He reasonably believes that such other
person is using or about to use deadly
physical force." [emphasis added]64
Under this statute, one of the critical elements is the
reasonable belief of the defenders. 65 This belief provides
a clue as to the accused's state of mind during the attack.
New York State's highest court, the New York State Court
of Appeals, has ruled that the perceptions, the state of mind
of the participants to the encounter, are critical to the claim
of justification. 66 Hence, the defendant's mental state is
dispositive in a self-defense case and is an issue which the
trier of fact must fully explore.
What standard is applied to determine the defender's
mens rea? The New York State Court of Appeals has promulgated the standard to determine the self-defenders mental state and the reasonableness of her beliefs with respect
to the self-defense statute.6 7 A jury must consider the circumstances facing the defender before she resorted to
deadly force. Also, the finder of fact must weigh the accused's prior experiences and the physical attributes of the
parties involved. The impact of these factors on the defendant's beliefs must then be examined. Finally, the jurors
must consider "in light of all the 'circumstances,' if a
reasonable person could have had those beliefs."68
B. The admissibility arguments for expert testimony
1. Relevance
In People v. Goetz the Court of Appeals held that a
jury must examine the defendant's prior experiences and
INTHE PmBUC INTEREST

the physical characteristics of the persons
involved to
69
evaluate the accused's self-defense claim.
In a Longmire-type case the expert would address two
points. First, the expert would discuss how the defendant's
experiences as a Black growing up in a country with a
history of white violence against Blacks shaped her fearful
mental state during the subject encounter. Secondly, the
expert would testify that the physical characteristic of race
significantly influenced this state of mind. Pursuant to the
interracial confrontation theory, the fact that the accused
is black and the attackers are white goes to the core of
this concept.
This argument addresses the relevance issue. 0
71
Relevance is one of the two basic theories of evidence.
Under this theory, an attorney could argue that expert
testimony on the black defendant's state of mind relates
to her fears and beliefs. Moreover, this evidence would
demonstrate how the defendant's life experience as a
persecuted American Black rendered reasonable her belief
of impending death or serious bodily harm.
2. The admissibility of expert testimony
on interracialconflict
a. State of mind expert testimony
The other basic theory is that of admissibility.72 Cen7
tral to the admissibility question is People v. Cronin. 1
Cronin held that expert testimony on the defendant's men-

tal state is admissible.
Cronin was charged with burglary and other related
offenses. During the commission of those offenses, Cronin
was acting under the influence of valium and alcohol. 4 At
trial the prosecution claimed that the accused had the
capacity to form the requisite states of mind for the subject offenses. 75 The defense attempted to rebut this theory
by submitting expert testimony. Such testimony would have
shown whether Cronin could have formed the specific intent to commit these crimes. The Monroe County trial court
ruled that the expert could testify on the general subject
of combining alcohol and valium. The expert could not
opine as to whether the defendant, while acting under the
influence of these drugs, could have formed the requisite
intent. 6 The Appellate Division, (Second Department),
New York State's intermediate appellate court, upheld the
77
lower court's decision.
But, the Court of Appeals reversed." Experts could
testify on the ultimate factual issues in a case, and in Cronin
that ultimate issue pertained to the defendant's ability to
form the required mens rea."9 The Court held that "ultimate
issue" testimony was permissible: "... so long as the facts
cannot be stated or described to the jury in such a manner
as to enable them to form an accurate judgment thereon,
and no better evidence than such [expert] opinions is attainable." ° Although the jury could have understood how
alcohol alone could have affected Cronin's state of mind,
the jurors might not have been able to comprehend the imSPRING 1988

pact of combining alcohol with a controlled substance such
as valium. 1 Such testimony was deemed beyond the jury's
ordinary training and experience. 2 Thus, the expert could
testify on the ultimate issue: whether the defendant himself
had the capacity to formulate the required mens rea. Such
8 3
testimony would not usurp the jury's fact-finding mission.
Additionally, the defendant was entitled to admission
because the prosecution deemed Cronin's state of mind
dispositive. It was unfair that the trial court barred Cronin's
opinion evidence on the defendant's state of mind but permitted the
People to broach the subject of Cronin's men84
tal state.
Using Cronin as the "centerpiece," the lawyer can
readily address the requirements for the admissibility of the
expert's testimony.
b. The requirementsfor admission
In a self-defense case there are three requirements for
admission. First, the expert must testify on a sociopsychological phenomenon beyond the jury's ordinary training and intelligence." Second, the expert must testify in
a non-normal justification case.8 6 Finally, the expert must
discuss subject matter sufficiently developed to permit a
reasonable opinion to be asserted by an expert.87
Courts throughout New York State have admitted expert evidence on various socio-psychological phenomena.
Among such phenomena are the battered women syndrome, 8 the stress and disorientation encountered by Laotian refugees in attempting to assimilate into American
culture,8 9 eyewitness repression phenomena,9" and untimely disclosure of child sexual abuse.9 '
To gain admission, the proferrer of the testimony must
demonstrate that the evidence depends on technical
knowledge or skill not within the range of ordinary training and intelligence. 92 An expert "must explain an arcane
subject, not otherwise
readily comprehensible to a jury of
92
lay persons."
(1) The battered women cases
In these cases this arcane subject is the battered
women syndrome. 94 Courts cannot assume that the jury
will understand why the battered woman fails to leave her
tormentor.9" Such testimony counters the notion that the
96
woman is a masochist who invites her abuse.
(2) Laotian stress
In People v. Aphaylath the Court of Appeals held that
a trial court committed reversible error when it excluded
expert testimony on the stress and disorientation encountered by Laotian refugees in attempting to assimilate
into American culture. 97 Mr. Aphaylath became enraged
when he saw his wife displaying affection to another man.
Mr. Aphaylath killed her and was indicted for second degree
murder. The defendant attempted to adduce expert
evidence. The expert would have stated that when such
affection is displayed in Laotian culture, the spumed
51
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lover/husband feels enough shame to compel him to lose
control. Aphaylath argued that this testimony was relevant
to his contention that he killed because of an extreme emotional disturbance."
The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision to exclude this testimony and the Appellate Division's
(Fourth Department's) affirmance thereof. The bar had impermissibly hampered the defendant's ability to present adequately his defense. 99 The Court followed the opinion of
the Fourth Department's lone dissenter, Justice Schnepp.' 0
Justice Schnepp supported admission. He argued that such
testimony is relevant and beyond the jury's training and experience.' 0 '
c. Expert testimony on interracialconflict from
a Black's perspective
In light of the battered women cases and Aphaylath,
a defense attorney can make several arguments for admission. Some of these contentions parallel those made by
the defendants in these two kinds of cases. First, the lawyer
might turn to State v. Brown.1" 2 In Brown the New Mexico Court of Appeals deemed admissible expert testimony
on the black defendant's fear of the police. The defendant
was charged with resisting arrest. The trial court barred
such evidence. The expert would have testified that the
black defendant would have most likely feared the police.
Such fear rested on Albuquerque Blacks' perception that
police are a threat to racial minorities. "... Mhe defendant's

fear of the police was relevant to whether [the] defendant
believed he was in imminent
danger of bodily harm - an
10 3
element of self-defense."
In a Longmire-type case the expert would testify that
the black defendant's fear of Whites was relevant to his
belief that he was in immediate danger of bodily harm. This
belief is a vital element under New York State law. In Goetz
the Court of Appeals held that a jury must apply the
reasonable person standard to assess the defendant's selfdefense claim. The jury would evaluate this claim by applying community standards. Therefore, an expert may be
extremely necessary to the black self-defender because
American society tends to perceive Blacks as incapable of
living up to white standards. Denial of expert testimony
to explain the black self-defender's conduct could unduly
prejudice the black defendant. 10 4 Hence, the trial court
should admit expert testimony in accordance with selfdefense law and Brown's teachings.
A Black's fear of Whites would be a sociopsychological phenomenon beyond the all-white jury's comprehension. Such a jury might be unable to grasp the meaning of fear as conditioned by the history of white racial
violence against Blacks. And again, the white jurors would
be likely to perceive any Black as violent.
Essentially, this argument hinges on the jury's racial
composition. Would this contention change if one or more
Blacks serve on a jury? Not necessarily. In the battered
women cases trial courts have admitted opinion evidence

on the battered woman syndrome despite the high
likelihood that one or more women would sit on the juries
in these cases. Expert testimony is allowed even though
female jurors might understand male domination and
brutality from a woman's perspective.
In Longmire's case, not one Black sat on the jury. In
areas where there are few Blacks, the likelihood for the Impaneling of an all-white jury is quite high.' 0 5 And, even if
there are one or more black jurors, there would be no
assurance that these Blacks would or even could understand that defendants like Longmire harbor a fear of hostile
Whites. Moreover, without the aid of expert testimony
there would be no guarantee that the black jurors could
understand how Blacks' socio-psychological orientation In
the United States produces this fear.
In fact, Ugwuegbu notes that in marginal evidence
cases Blacks also are more inclined to ascribe guilt to
Blacks than to Whites. 0 6 Therefore, a black defendant may
need an expert to overcome this ascription in cases wherein
an all white, integrated or all black jury sits.' 0°
Both battered women cases and Longmire-type cases
re-enact history. In the former, this history involves an
abusive male who overpowers and"conquers? his female.'08
Historically, white males in the United States have inflicted
bodily and psychological harm on women and Blacks. Such
harm has had an impact on the socio-psycholdgical conditioning of both classes of victims.'0 9 These victims have
learned to fear their tormentors. Such fear may influence
their responses to violence initiated by their white (male)
tormentors." 0
In the battered women cases these facts constitute a
sufficient basis for admission of expert testimony. Likewise,
in Longmire-type cases, these facts operate and support
an argument for admission. Expert testimony is needed to
explain what kinds of historical forces may have impelled
the defenders in these cases to attack and kill their aggressors. A jury must consider the physical attributes of
all the participants in the respective cases and the defenders'
life experiences and states of mind.' "In these two classes
of cases race, sex, and history are factors which a jury must
weigh. An expert can expound on these areas to facilitate
such weighing.
In the battered women cases, trial courts have
recognized the history of discrimination, admitting that
woman's fear and the batterer's conduct are the product
of our nation's history of sex discrimination and male
domination of women."I2 Expert testimony explains to the
trier of fact how this history shapes the woman's fear of
her abuser and consequent course of action.
If courts are willing to take judicial notice of the history
of sex discrimination, they should also acknowledge the
history of racial discrimination and white mob violence
against Blacks. Hence, courts should admit an expert who
can explain - much like her counterpart in the battered
women cases - how the influence of such history on a
black defender's state of mind and subsequent conduct
INTHE PUBUC INTEREST

resulted from contact with the accused's assailants.
The admission of expert testimony on interracial conflict from a black defender's perspective is just as, if not
more, compelling than the admission of an "Aphaylathtype" expert. American Blacks have faced stress inflicted
by whites for a longer period of time than Laotians. White
mob violence against Blacks is still widespread. During
1986 and 1987 there was an increase in the number of
New York City racial bias incidents or, in the number of
reports of these incidents."' The United States Supreme
Court has deemed Blacks a "suspect" class under the Fourteenth Amendment because of racial discrimination in this
country. 1 4 The Court has not afforded such status to Laotians. Thus, if the Court of Appeals is willing to allow expert evidence on stresses encountered by a non-suspect
class, a trial court should admit such evidence addressing
the stresses of a suspect class.
In Longmire the State made interracial conflict an
issue. The prosecution adduced testimony that the defendant made racial remarks against a white attacker. One
of the youths testified that Longmire told him: "I could cut
you, too, white meat!" Essentially, the People portrayed a
black youth who was hostile and acted violently toward
Whites. This view could have confirmed the jurors' perception of Blacks as being violent and hostile toward Whites.
Barring expert evidence would unduly prejudice a Black
defender. In Cronin the Court of Appeals held it unfair that
a trial court allowed the State to present a picture of the
defendant and excluded expert testimony to counter such
a portrayal.1 5 Moreover, exclusion may prevent the defendant from adequately presenting her defense - also a concern of the Court." 6
3. The Section 60.55 obstacle and non-normal
justification cases
If an attorney decides to call an expert to testify, she
probably would want the expert to interview and examine
the defendant. At trial, the expert may testify as to what
the defendant said during his interview. The defendant's
statements made to the expert could support the expert's
scientific conclusions. However, these statements might be
inadmissible under the New York Criminal Law [cited as
"CPL].
CPL Section 60.55 proscribes the admission of such
statements unless they are made to a psychiatrist or
licensed psychologist. More importantly, these remarks
must pertain only to the defense of lack of criminal responsibility, by reason of mental disease or defect." 17 At first
blush it appears that expert testimony not addressing a
mental disease or defect is impermissible.
In People v. Hamel, the Appellate Division, Third
Department so construed Section 60.55"18 In fact, the
Hamel Court held that a court must not only bar any outof-court statements which the defendant has made to the
expert, but also the expert testimony itself. Exclusion must
be the rule in cases wherein the defendant fails to advance
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a claim of mental disease or defect." 9
How can the defendant overcome such an obstacle?
Clearly, the defense attorney in an interracial self-defense
case, is not claiming that a mental disease or defect compelled his client to defend himself by use of deadly force.
Rather, the accused Black's life experience produced a fear
for his physical safety. This fear leads the defendant to defend himself. Such a fearing state of mind and conduct were
not the products of a mental disease or defect.
The racial-fear argument parallels that offered by defendants in battered women cases. In these cases, there is not
a claim that the women act under the influence of a mental disorder. 120 The woman's defensive conduct is the product of a fear shaped by2continuous physical, psychological,
and emotional abuse.' '
In the battered women cases New York State trial
courts have admitted expert testimony on the battered
women syndrome, Section 60.55 notwithstanding. In admitting expert testimony on the syndrome, a Bronx
County trial judge noted that admission is not predicated
on the defendant asserting that a mental disorder led to
the alleged criminal act. 22 Circumventing the constraining language of Section 60.55 and Hamel, the judge implicitly held that if the defendant claims her case to be a
"non-normal" justification case, expert testimony on arcane
23
socio-psychological phenomena is admissible.
Precisely what constitutes a non-normal justification
case is a bit unclear. Perhaps, such a case involves the
operation of complex socio-psychological phenomena. If
this is the definition of a non-normal justification case, then
a Longmire-type defendant must prove to his trial court
that his expert will testify on such phenomena. The fear
conditioned by the defendant's black life experience may
124
qualify.
4. The development of the study on interracial
attitudes from black perspectives
At trial the black self-defender must show that his expert will testify on subject matter that is sufficiently
25
developed to permit an expert opinion to be rendered.
There is an extensive amount of literature and data addressing black perspectives on Whites. Additionally, here are
numerous works on the history of racial discrimination in
America and on interracial attitudes generally.
For example, in Black Rage, Grier and Cobbs detail
how Blacks have come both to fear and hate Whites
because of Whites' degradation of and infliction of violence
on American Blacks. 126 In Listen, White Man, Fm Bleeding,
Crewsome graphically illustrates how Whites' prejudicial
attitudes manifested themselves in the hunting, capturing,
and the torturing of a Black in the South during the late
1950s.' 2 7
Numerous, and painfully graphic, these works present
experiences and emotions with which only American
Blacks and perhaps other American minority groups have
grappled. These experiences are quite tangible and have
53

shaped black interracial attitudes.
In light of the research on these attitudes and the
American black experience itself, an expert may reasonably
opine that the defendant's fear was induced by a confrontation with hostile Whites, the historical tormentors of
Blacks.
Finally, the expert must be substantially familiar with
the arcane subject matter about which she is to testify.
Knowledge can be accrued through the reading of
numerous articles and books, or through the analysis of
empirical data. Someone who teaches courses on the subject socio-psychological phenomena or has12 substantial
clinical experience therewith would qualify.'

V. LIMITING THE ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT
TESTIMONY ON INTERRACIAL
CONFLICT IN SELF-DEFENSE CASES
If a trial judge is to admit expert testimony on interracial conflict, may a court allow such testimony in a case
wherein the initial aggressors are black and the self-defender
is white? The response is that a trial court may permit a
defendant's expert to testify only in self-defense cases involving a white-on-black confrontation (Longmire-type
scenario). Testimony in a case involving a black-on-white
confrontation (Goetz-type scenario) should be excluded.
What are the inherent differences between Longmiretype and Goetz-type conflagrations? The differences lie in
the nature of the conflict and public perceptions of and attitudes toward the players therein.
A. A Re-enactment of History
Interracial conflict of whites against blacks follows an
historial pattern. Whites assume their historical role as
persecutors. Blacks are the persecuted. Unlike the
Longmire-type case, no re-enactment of history occurs in
Goetz-type cases. There is no historical documentation of
calculated and systematic black mob violence against
Whites. Blacks have resorted to mob violence against
Whites to counter or protest against racial oppression and
29
to secure civil rights denied by discriminatory Whites.'
To counter this argument, one might assert that Blacks
through their participation in violent crime, have assaulted
White society: although Blacks are not discriminating
130
against Whites, Blacks as a group are attacking Whites.

Consequently, a White would have a justifiable fear for his
life if confronted by Blacks.
However, this contention overlooks the fact that
Blacks are at least six times more likely to bear the brunt
of these assaults than Whites. Statistically, Blacks are more
likely than whites to be the victims of violent crimes
perpetrated by Blacks.13 ' If criminals do indeed assault
society, they attack black society much more frequently
than they attack white society. Only a black Bernhard
Goetz attacked by Blacks could claim that his fear of being mugged emanated from a history of violence in the
United States.
54
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Thus, Goetz would not have had a legal basis for arguing for the admissibility of expert testimony on interracial
conflict. Such a basis would stem from a similarity of the
Goetz case facts to those of cases involving battered
women, on whose behalf courts admit expert testimony.
Yet, in the Goetz case there is no such similarity, because
Goetz did not involve a re-enactment of history. The
absence of such a similarity eroded the legal basis for the
admission of an expert in Goetz.
B. Public Perception of Longmire-type and
Goetz-type Cases
Longmire-type and Goetz-type cases are distinguishable on other grounds. With respect to crime, Blacks and
Whites are perceived differently: Blacks are perceived as
wrong-doers and Whites are not. Further, Whites are
thought to be the victims. Allport confirmed this perception when he examined blame ascription. In his famous
study, Alport showed people a picture of a black male apparently confronting a white man on a subway train. The
White held a razor at his side. The majority of black and
white participants recalled that the black man brandished
the razor.'
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Although Allport conducted his study over thirty years
ago, recent studies on guilt attribution and the own-race
effect affirm Allport's findings.1 34 The public's reactions to
Goetz and Longmire buttress this claim as well. In both
cases, the initial prevailing assumptions were that the
Blacks were culpable and the Whites were not. If both
defendants sought to proffer expert testimony on interracial
conflict, should the trial court admit such evidence in both
cases?
Responding to this question, one might apply an
Aphaylath admissibility argument. InAphaylath, the Court
of Appeals noted that the trial court's denial of expert
testimony on Laotian stress may have unduly prejudiced
Aphaylath. Exclusion may have foreclosed Aphaylath from
presenting an adequate defense. With respect to the
Longmire-type and Goetz-type cases, one might ask which
type of defendant would, in fact, be unduly prejudiced if
the respective trial courts were to exclude opinion evidence
on interracial conflict. Of course it is the black defendant
and not the white who would be prejudiced. Prior to the
Goetz trial, the public hailed Goetz as a hero. 3 5 The
populace assumed that Goetz was in the right and that his
victims were in the wrong. 136 Goetz is a member of a class
which the public does not readily link with crime. Goetz
would not need to offer an expert to challenge any societal
prejudices against him or his race. Also, a Goetz court's
admission of expert testimony would essentially reaffirm
society's false conceptions of Blacks, further undermining
the public's faith in our courts. 37
In contrast, the Goetz interpretation of Section 35.15
necessitates the admission of expert testimony for the black
self-defender. The Court of Appeals promulgated an objective standard for juries to assess the accused's state of
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mind. The jury must apply community standards to assess
this mental state.' 3 8 A black self-defender would need an
expert to explain to the jury that by resorting to deadly
force, he complied with community standards. This is so
because our society perceives Blacks as being unable to
live up to predominantly white community standards.
The Longmire-type case arises against this backdrop
and society's tendency to attribute wrong to Blacks. In this
case, the black defendant has apparently conformed to his
naturally violent stereotype and killed a white person. If the
case is a marginal evidence one, the average American jury
probably will assume the black defender to be guilty
because of his race. Hence, the trial court would be unduly prejudicing the black defender by barring admission
of expert testimony on interracial conflict. By presenting
an expert, the defendant could counter these prejudices.
C. Fear and the Races
On January 8, 1987, the New York Times published
a survey on the interracial attitudes and perceptions of New
York City residents.1 39 The survey concluded that Whites
are more likely to fear Blacks than Blacks are to fear
Whites. 140 Also, Blacks distrust Whites more so than
Whites distrust Blacks.14 1 In light of this survey and the
aforementioned widely held stereotypes, the average
American jury comprised largely of Whites would be (and
was) able to comprehend the fear Goetz experienced as
a result of his encounter with the four black youths on the
subway train.' 42 Therefore, Goetz did not need an expert
to explain to this jury what it probably believed and assumGoetz
ed: Whites fear Blacks and it was very plausible that
43
feared for his life because of the youths' race.
Conversely, such a jury would probably assume that
a Longmire-type defendant acted out of anger and aggression because of her race. The jury would find it very difficult to believe that any Black could be afraid of Whites.
Therefore, a Longmire-type defender would need an expert to explain that the black defendant can fear Whites
because of the latter's race. This fear is just as real as the
fear Whites feel when they encounter Blacks.
D. What if Goetz was Black and his Attackers White?
Should the trial judge admit expert testimony on interracial conflict from the black Goetz's perspective? The
answer is, "Yes!" The expert could not testify on the Black
Goetz fear of crime because such testimony would cover
subject matter within the range of the ordinary New York
City juror's experience. However, the expert could discuss
the black Goetz's fear of Whites because of history. On
cross-examination, the prosecution could elicit any possible biases which the black Goetz may have harbored
against Whites.
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VI. CONCLUSION AND A LOOK
TO THE FUTURE
In the United States, a black defendant must overcome
substantial systematic and jury biases. This is especially
true for a Black accused of a capital crime, particularly if
the Black is charged with killing a White.
A self-defense claim might exculpate the black accused of killing a White. However, the defendant's own
testimony might not be sufficient. The strength of the selfdefense facts notwithstanding, the jury might be unwilling
to believe the defendant because of her race. The prosecution might convince the jury that the defendant acted
violently, simply by highlighting evidence in conformance
with the jury's inherent racism and propensity to stereotype
by virtue of ract, gender and class.
To assure that the jury gives her a "fair shake," the
defendant may desire to offer opinion evidence on interracial conflict from a Black's perspective. This testimony
would enhance the defendant's testimony. By
demonstrating that the defendant is capable of fear and
by discussing the source of that fear, the expert could show
that the defendant is not a violent stereotype. The defendant would become an individual fearful for her life because
of her assailant's race, rather than a racist stereotype. The
expert would show that the black defendant experiences
a fear of Whites which is similar to that which a White experiences when faced with seemingly hostile Blacks.
Thus, by countering popular stereotypes of Blacks and
by showing why Blacks fear Whites in interracial conflict,
the expert would offer invaluable testimony. Without this
testimony, instead of confirmed socio-scientific evidence
operating, the prejudices of white America could prevail.
This would deny the defendant her right to a trial free from
prejudice.
The necessity for expert testimony on interracial conflict in self-defense cases is manifest. Within the last year,
there has been an increase in the number of reported New
York State bias crimes. The likelihood of a Longmire-type
case transpiring is growing. Unless trial courts seriously
consider the admission of expert testimony on interracial
conflict from a Black's perspective, the likelihood that society's racial prejudice will prevail in a black defender's case
is also great.
With New York State trial courts willing to admit expert testimony on the battered woman syndrome and on
Laotian stress, the admission of the type of testimony
discussed in this paper should follow. The analogy of a
Longmire case to the battered women cases and to
Aphaylath supports an admissibility argument for opinion
evidence on interracial conflict.
In keeping with this, a Goetz-type defendant should
not be allowed to summon an expert on interracial conflict. There is no legal basis for admitting an expert for such
a defendant. There is no re-enactment of history in the
Goetz scenario; thus, no parallel to the battered women
cases exist. The white self-defender would not be unduly

prejudiced by non-admission because Whites are viewed
as crime victims.
Furthermore, admission becomes all the more compelling because of the United States Supreme Courfs Ohio
v. Martin decision.144 In Martin the Court held that States
may require that defendants prove self-defense. In New
York State, the prosecution must disprove the defendant's
self-defense claim beyond a reasonable doubt. 14s According to the Court, the burden shift is not unconstitutional.
In view of this ruling, a State may mandate that a defendant prove her self-defense assertion.
If New York State was to shift the burden of proving
self-defense to the defendant, in a Longrnire-type case the
black defendant would need all the help she could get to
counter the racial bias and to prove her self-defense case.
Exclusion of helpful expert testimony on interracial conflict in Longmire-type cases would impermissibly hinder the
presentation of an adequate defense by the one required
to prove justification beyond a reasonable doubt.
Martin also renders less impervious the CPL Section
60.55 and Hamel restrictions. If New York were to shift
the burden of proving self-defense to the defendant, it would
be following its decision to shift the burden of proving insanity to the defendant.146 Under Section 60.55, with such
a burden a defendant claiming lack of culpability because
of a mental disease or defect may offer opinion evidence
on her mental state at the time of the subject incident.
Therefore, it follows that both the self-defender, and
her counterpart pleading insanity, who bear the burden of
proving their exculpatory claims, should be entitled to the
admission of expert testimony regarding their respective
subject incidents. Perhaps New York State will sanction
this entitlement by amending Section 60.55 and thereby
permit experts to testify on a socio-psychological
phenomena beyond the ken of the jury. This amendment
would recognize case law favoring admission. In Longmiretype cases, this recognition would enable black selfdefenders to overcome the prejudices which deny such
defendants their constitutional right to a trial free from all
prejudice.
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